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ABSTRACT
The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center directed international attention to the
financial component of terrorist operations. The demand for forensic accounts has continued to increase
because of a growing intolerance for fraud and terrorist activity. Forensic accountants have and will
continue to have a vital role in United States’ counterterrorism efforts in the post-9/11 era by detecting
acts of fraud and money laundering. Comprehensive review of relevant literature including books, peerreviewed articles, government databases, court records and news media confirms that forensic
accountants are equipped with special skills and analytical tools that make them valuable members of
terrorism task forces. The soft skills of forensic accountants typically include attention to detail, selfmotivation, professional communication, and integrity. Technical skills include broad industry
knowledge, data gathering techniques, advanced financial statement interpretation, and ratio analysis.
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Literature review also indicates that government organizations are increasingly reliant on
financial analysts for gathering evidence and preparing summary reports for investigations,
prosecutions, and court proceedings. Additionally, a demand exists for forensic accountants in privatesector companies to implement and monitor systems of internal control (e.g. fraud and enterprises risk
management frameworks) and communicate threats to the FBI or Department of Homeland Security.
While past research mainly includes retrospective analysis of terrorist financing, this paper will argue
that forensic accounting will continue to be relevant due to technological change and shifting political,
legal, and financial climates.
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The Role of Forensic Accounting in U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts
INTRODUCTION
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (2004) estimates
that the September 11th attacks cost the organizers anywhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to
perpetrate. The terrorists were able to successfully transfer these funds without raising suspicion
of financial or government institutions, which resulted in one of the most devastating terror
attacks on U.S. soil with approximately 3,000 deaths and billions of dollars in damages
(Alexander, 2004). Governments, banks, and other institutions have since strived to implement
controls to prevent and detect acts of terrorist financing. These efforts include utilizing the
special skillset of forensic accountants in both public and private sectors to identify, prosecute,
and aid in the eradication of terrorists and their sympathizers from the U.S. economy.
This study applied a qualitative approach to discover the role of forensic accounting in
U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the post 9/11 era. Results emerged after careful reading of
content and comprehensive review of relevant literature from both primary and secondary
sources. Primary sources of high authority include U.S. District, Appellate, and Supreme Court
rulings; transcripts from United Nation’s International Convention for the Suppression of
Financing Terrorism; and various publications from U.S. Executive Agencies including the
Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury. Other primary sources referenced
include publications from the National Counterterrorism Center, publications from accounting
professional organizations (e.g. AICPA), and interviews with forensic accountants and special
agents within the FBI. Secondary sources referenced include textbooks, peer-reviewed articles in
professional journals, and news articles. Qualitative analysis of relevant literature reveals that
forensic accountants make valuable members of terrorism task forces due to their detailed
financial training and unique ability to detect nuances in cash flows. This paper attempts to
contribute to our understanding of terrorist financing and the specific role that forensic
accountants have in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
OVERVIEW OF TERRORIST FINANCING
Defining Terrorism
Discussion the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist financing” requires a definition of these
terms. Unfortunately, it is difficult and often counterproductive to have a globally agreed-upon
definition of terrorism. First, terror is an abstract psychological response, and there are always
exceptions to abstract definitions. Secondly, because terrorism is constantly evolving, it is almost
impossible to create an all-inclusive definition. Dr. Walter Laqueur states that “no all-embracing
definition will ever be found for the simple reason that there is not one terrorism, but there have
been many terrorisms, greatly differing in time and space, in motivation, and in manifestations
and aims” (2007). However, for the purpose of this paper we will use the definition of terrorism
provided by Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988):
“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by
(semi)clandestine individual, group, or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political
reasons, whereby- in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the
main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly
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(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target
population and serve as message generators” (p. 28).
The term “terrorist financing” refers to the funds obtained from both legal and illegal sources,
transferred between parties, and used to advance the interests of terror groups or to fund specific
activities. The UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
defines funds related to terrorism as:
“assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however
acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital,
evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits,
traveler’s checks, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit” (The
United Nations, 1999).
For example, the funds related to the 9/11 attacks included cash, traveler’s checks, and debit and
credit cards. These funds were sent and received through bank-to-bank transfers and were
primarily used to finance flight training, living expenses, and travel (National Commission,
2004).
Financial Needs of Terrorists
Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, stated, “Terrorists seldom kill
for money, but they always need money to kill” (2007). Terrorist organizations are essentially in
the business of terrorizing, in which they incur substantial operational costs just like legitimate
businesses (Gurulé, 2008). Perpetrating a terrorist attack of any scale requires the careful
planning and controlling of vital resources including money, people, and materials. Terrorists
fund their operations both legally and illegally with activities extending across the globe
(Raphaeli, 2003). These funds are needed for obtaining false documents, explosive chemicals,
transportation, communications, equipment, and weapons (Koh, 2006; Gurulé, 2008). Other
costs incurred include general livelihood expenses (e.g. housing, food, uniforms), training
facility maintenance, and compensation for soldiers and their families. For example, Al-Qaida
supported approximately 70,000 soldiers in extensive training camp networks before the 9/11,
and reports in Palestine show that as much as $30,000 is given to the surviving relatives of
suicide bombers (Koh, 2006, p.12-13).
Terrorists develop strong relationships with the nations or regions where they operate by
financially supporting other militant groups with similar goals and soliciting the social and
political cooperation of key leaders in their territories. For example, before the 9/11 attacks,
Osama bin Laden repeatedly reached out to Taliban leader Mullah Mohamed Omar, “the most
powerful man in Afghanistan at that time” for support (Curry, 2013, p.16-17). Additionally,
terrorist organizations create safe havens by donating to charities or other public service
organizations like schools and mosques to win the favor of local communities (Gurulé, 2008).
Like any other business, substantial capital is critical for maintaining the organizational structure
and growing the operations of a terrorist organization; however, the means and motives of
obtaining and moving capital for terrorism are of a more sinister nature.

Obtaining and Laundering Funds
Terrorist financing can come from external sources such as individual donations,
businesses, governments or banking systems, while activities that generate cash within terrorist
organizations can include drug and human trafficking, kidnapping, ransom, blackmail or credit
card fraud (Levitt, 2002; Koh, 2006). Abu Sayyaf, a radical Islamist sect in the Philippines,
obtained nearly $5.5 million by kidnapping citizens and demanding ransoms; the sect was able to
expand their ranks from 200 to 3,000 individuals in the early 2000s and became the largest
employer in many poor areas of the Philippines (Koh, 2006, p.12). Additionally, a 2003 joint
FBI-DEA investigation resulted in the arrests of sixteen Afghan and Pakistani individuals
involved in an extensive heroin operation. These individuals smuggled drugs into the U.S., and
the profits were laundered by stateside businessmen who returned the funds to criminal
counterparts in the Taliban and Al-Qaida (McCraw, 2003).
Money laundering. Terrorist organizations are often tasked with transforming proceeds
from illegal activities into useable assets (Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2015). This process is
known as money laundering, or “disguising… the existence, nature, source, control, beneficial
ownership, location, and disposition of property derived from criminal activity” (ACFE, 2016).
According to Choo (2009), there are three stages of money laundering: placement, integration
and layering. The individuals place the assets in use, disguise the funds with legitimate income,
and reinvest or redistribute the funds. For example, dirty money from a drug or weapons
operation can be used to purchase prepaid cards or layered with other income from a legitimate
business. Then, this pool of “legitimate” funds can be used to purchase materials necessary to
continue illegitimate operations.
While terrorist financing often involves money laundering, Koh (2006) argues that the
final product of terrorist financing is distinguishable from other criminal activities as shown in
Figure 1 below. Koh states that “money laundering begins with brushing off the audit trail and
ends by achieving legitimization, while terrorist financing begins with money making and ends
with distributing it” (2016, p. 27). While a drug lord might launder money through a restaurant to
hide the illegal source of his income to appear as a legitimate businessman, a terrorist
organization might launder money through a restaurant to later distribute it for its operations and
expenses, not for personal profit or legitimate societal status.

Figure 1. Disguising the funds related to a terrorist operation is means to an end, not the goal.
Source: Koh, J. (2006).

Off-book financing allows a company to conceal revenues in accounts not listed in the
financial statements, and businesses that deal heavily in cash are at a higher risk for fraud
(Mantone, 2013; Messier, Glover & Prawitt, 2016). Terrorists often launder funds through
companies such as bars, restaurants, waste paper brokers, laundry mats, car washes, check
cashing, wire-transmitting services, and non-profits1 (Dorrell & Gadawski, 2005; ACFE, 2016).
These types of businesses are cash-intensive making it easier for criminals to disguise dirty
money in pools of legitimate business income by contriving fictitious sales receipts or invoices
(Reuter & Truman, 2004). For example, Abdirahman Isse and Abdillah Abdi operated a wiretransmitting service out of Virginia which became a subsidiary for a network headquartered in
the United Arab Emirates. The business assisted customers who sent funds to Somalia, Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Sudan from 1997 to 2001. Isse and Abdi routinely deposited and withdrew funds just
below $10,000 and were found guilty of conspiracy to structure financial transactions to evade
reporting requirements.2 The U.S. Department of Treasury was able to freeze the assets of the
network with proof that the money-transmitting business was a channel for terrorist sympathizers
to funnel cash to Al-Qaida cells in Africa and the Middle East (U.S. v. Isse, 2003).
Money trails nearly disappear with the use of prepaid products like “burner” phones or
cash cards, which are not traceable to a specific individual or bank account. The advantages of
prepaid cards include anonymity, convenience, affordability, and reduction of overdraft risk. The
use of prepaid cards requires no face-to-face verification, and the cards can be hidden among
other personal items to avoid detection by customs officials at international borders. These cards
can be drained, reloaded instantly from anywhere in the world, and carried by mules to fund
terrorist activities (Choo, 2009).
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING
Terrorist organizations, like legitimate businesses, need money to continue to fund their
operations. “Follow the money” is a common phrase in accounting and investigative
communities. The phrase is simple, but investigations are often complicated by factors including
the use of prepaid cards, extensive laundering schemes, and carefully crafted transactions that
fall just below mandatory financial institution reporting. If the intent to commit an act of
terrorism can be proven, an individual can be prosecuted under U.S. laws without funds ever
moving locations (Dorrell & Gadawski, 2005). However, intent is very difficult to prove in court
because it occurs in the criminal’s mind. Forensic accountants can utilize a wide array of
technical skills to establish “a sufficient pattern of fraudulent transactions or activities” to
provide evidence necessary for the prosecution of terrorists (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, p. 41).
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants defines forensic accounting as “the
application of accountancy skills and knowledge in circumstances that have legal consequences”
(ACCA, 2015). Forensic accounting is often confused with auditing, but inquiries conducted by
forensic accountants are generally more in-depth and of a wider scope than audits (Bilbeisi &
Osama bin Laden was known to have an extensive global network of companies in wood and paper industries,
hospital equipment, fishing boats, and real estate (Koh, 2006).
2
Under the Bank Secrecy Act, financial institutions are required to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) to
combat money laundering in the United States. The law requires any cash transactions exceeding $10,000 (daily
aggregate amount) to be included in these reports. More information about the mandatory reporting requirements
can be found at https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/bsa/index-bsa.html.
1

Brown, 2015). An anonymous agent within the FBI describes forensic accounting as a “360” of
accounting; in other words, forensic accounting requires knowledge beyond foundational
accounting. It is necessary to know not just how to report a transaction correctly, but how a
transaction can be reported incorrectly and hidden or covered up. The agent states that forensic
accounting involves reverse engineering, or taking events and transactions apart to see how they
fit together. The agent states, “Investigators at the Bureau must continually ask themselves what
the terrorists are thinking when they try to launder money” (FBI Forensic Accountant, personal
communication, February 8, 2017). Due to this, there is a need for highly-specialized individuals
who are trained in accounting to assist in terrorist investigations.
Soft Skills of Forensic Accountants
Literature review results indicate that accountants possess unique personality traits,
communications skills, and strict ideals of integrity that empower them to detect financial
crimes. According to Carl Jung (1971), there are eight personality types that dominate society;
these traits can be divided into four dichotomous pairs: extraversion versus introversion, sensing
versus intuition, thinking versus feeling, and judging versus perceiving. Jung argues that an
individual has a dominate trait in each of the four pairs; this theory has been adapted into the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) as shown in Figure 2 below. Research indicates that while
all MBIT personalities are represented in the accounting profession, a prevalent number of
Sensors and Judgers are attracted to and retained in the industry (Schloemer, 2015; Swain &
Olsen, 2012; Kovar et al. 2003; Wheeler, 2001). By following 1,208 students throughout college
and into their professional careers, Swain and Olsen (2012) found that Sensors and Judgers were
respectively 9.48 and 1.59 times more likely than their pair counterparts to major in accounting
(p. 30). Similar results were found in studies conducted by Oswick and Barber (1998), Ramsay et
al. (2000), Bealing et al. (2006), and Garlick et al. (2013).

Figure 2. Accountants dominate Sensing and Judging personality types on the MBTI. Source:
“Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Grid.” KONA. (n.d.).
According to the MBIT, Sensors are typically more concerned with facts; these
individuals are logical, realistic, and bottom line-oriented. In contrast to Intuitors, Sensors rely
more on their own experiences rather than information given. Furthermore, Judgers enjoy
making lists and staying on task. In contrast to perceivers, Judgers are less flexible with
deadlines and prefer to streamline decision-making (Martin, 1997). Because Sensing and Judging
personality types are prevalent in the profession, abilities such as attention to detail, organization
and self-motivation dominate a typical accountant’s skillset. For example, an anonymous special
agent within the Financial Crimes Unit of the FBI describes his background in public accounting
as an advantage over other agents in the same investigative field. He states that in his experience,
the accounting mind is trained to work differently and approaches tasks with specificity (FBI
Agent & Forensic Accountant, personal communication, November 20, 2017).
Communication and professional client interaction is a key skill required in the
accounting industry. Alan Anderson (2012) lists “people skills” and “superior communication
skills” as two qualities that a good accountant must possess. Individuals with a background in
auditing are trained to communicate their findings both orally and in writing. Similarly, tax
specialists are trained to explain complicated legal codes and other tax laws to clients. Expert
witness testimony is a large professional role of fraud consultants and forensic accountants.
These individuals must possess the ability to condense in-depth findings and communicate them
in a way that is understandable to lawyers, juries, and judges (Dorrell & Gadawski, 2005). With
the rise of technology, face-to-face interaction is a fading phenomenon; however, successful

accountants are trained to maintain effective communication and professionalism at all times and
through a multitude of mediums (Anderson, 2012).
Accountants have historically been associated with integrity and honesty, and these ideals
are communicated to accounting students in classrooms and throughout the professional careers
of CPA’s (Bougen, 1994; AICPA, 2017). A CPA who is a member of the AICPA must comply
with the organization’s Code of Professional Conduct.3 The Code’s policy on integrity states, “In
the performance of any professional service, a member shall maintain objectivity and integrity,
shall be free of conflicts of interest, and shall not knowingly misrepresent facts or subordinate his
or her judgment to others” (2017, p. 30). Messier, Glover, and Prawitt (2016) describe the
profession’s dedication to integrity in their textbook on auditing and assurance services:
“Certified public accountants have been charged with providing audit services because of
their traditional reputation of competence, independence, objectivity, and concern for the
public interest. As a result, they are able to add credibility to information produced and
reported by management to outside parties” (p. 8).
Integrity, transparency, and objectivity dominate industry conduct expectations, which are
demonstrated by the core values of the Big Four4 accounting firms:
Ernst & Young: “Who we are- People who demonstrate integrity… who build
relationships based on doing the right thing.”
Deloitte: “We believe that nothing is more important than our reputation, and behaving
with the highest levels of integrity is fundamental to who we are.”
PwC: “Act with integrity. In everything we do… we speak up for what is right, even
when it’s the harder option.”
KPMG: “Above all, we act with integrity – constantly striving to uphold the highest
professional standards, provide sound advice, and rigorously maintain our
independence.”
Thus, accountants are familiar with the personal and professional expectation to adhere to the
highest ethical standards, a sought-out quality among numerous government organizations
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency.5
Technical Skills of Forensic Accountants
Terrorists have basic financial needs that must be fulfilled in order to maintain operations
and execute attacks. Forensic accountants are equipped with the technical skills necessary to
examine cash flows across a variety of mediums to assist in gathering evidence and creating
While the AICPA can only require its members to comply with the Code of Professional Conduct, U.S. state and
federal courts have consistently held all CPAs to the principles outlined in the Code. As of 2016, twenty-three states
have adopted the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct as their ethical and conduct standards (Messier, et al., 2016).
4 The listed core values of the Big Four accounting firms were obtained from each firm’s website at the time of
writing.
5
Integrity is included in the core values of both the CIA and FBI listed on the organizations’ respective websites
at the time of writing. The CIA states, “We uphold the highest standards of conduct. We seek and speak the truth - to
our colleagues and to our customers.” Similarly, the FBI’s core values include a dedication to “uncompromising
personal integrity and institutional integrity.”
3

financial profiles (Bilbeisi & Brown, 2015). Botha (2009) describes a forensic investigation as
“an in-depth, more detailed investigation into finances and financial matters undertaken for court
or law purposes and is similar in character to a criminal investigation. It utilizes specialized
skills, expert knowledge, and scientific methods” (p.115). The technical skills of forensic
accountants include broad industry knowledge, advanced financial statement interpretation, data
gathering, and analysis techniques.
Forensic accountants often have various backgrounds in auditing, taxes, litigation,
consulting, and banking; therefore, these individuals have the industry knowledge of what
financial statements should look like and the attention to detail to detect anomalies and/or
misinformation. For example, a forensic accountant might recognize when the fees for a certain
transaction look too high or too low, or when the expenses claimed by a charity are higher than
the industry norm (FBI Forensic Accountant, personal communication, February 8, 2017).
Forensic expert Pam Mantone states in her book on financial statement analysis that “abnormal
growth in days sales in receivables [Accounts receivables ÷ Total credit sales per day] when
compared to benchmarks of similar companies” and “the growth in profit margins [Net income ÷
net sales] that are in excess of industry standards” are early warning signs of fraud (2013, p.20).
Therefore, a forensic accountant’s industry knowledge can expedite the investigative process by
gathering data and examining financial statements for manipulation. Marc Curry (2013)
describes the importance of forensic accounting in gathering data for financial
investigations:
“Using their basic accounting and auditing skills, forensic accountants also utilize their
understanding of economic theory and data gathering when analyzing, interpreting and
summarizing their findings when they conduct their audits… The forensic accountant
picks apart every receipt and financial statement they are reviewing and in a way work
backwards to calculate any patterns within the money trail” (p.200).
If the forensic expert expects that fraud is being committed by examining data, a more thorough
investigation can be conducted.
Forensic accountants typically have a background in public accounting, are comfortable
around financial statements, and are familiar with the nuances of money flow. Coupled with
necessary industry knowledge, forensic accountants are more likely to detect when an individual
or company has committed fraud. A common financial crime is the overstatement of assets and
revenues or understatement of expenses and liabilities in financial reporting (Crumbley et al.,
2007). For example, Sunbeam Corporation began using “bill and hold sales” to manipulate
earnings in 1997. The company offered buyers lower prices for purchase orders well in advance
of needed items and maintained custody of the goods until delivery was requested. The SEC
described the scheme as “little more than projected orders disguised as sales” (2001).
Additionally, companies can omit proper disclosures or engage in fraudulent related-party
transactions to disguise unfavorable information from financial statements, as was the case in the
1990s with Enron’s special-purpose entities (SPEs)6 (Crumbley et al., 2007). Considering frauds
such as this, forensic accountants developed a wide array of data analytics and ratio functions
that are powerful tools in detecting abnormalities in financial data.
Enron CFO, Andy Fastow, sold company stock to special-purpose entities and fraudulently recorded the
promissory note as an addition, rather than reduction, of equity (Crumbley, et al., 2007).
6

Net Worth Method. Forensic accountants and investigators can directly trace cash flows
through various accounting and financial records. However, in the instance that a financial
records statement crime is being committed, the perpetrator takes precautions to cover his trail,
and these documents are often not available (Botha, 2009). If investigators identify a suspect that
is living unexplainably lavish, the Net Worth Method can be used to indirectly calculate an
estimate of income to compare to the amount on an individual’s tax returns. Investigators
calculate the individual’s net worth (assets less liabilities) and account for explainable
differences, such as nontaxable income. Any significant differences that cannot be accounted for
are red flags (Crumbley et al., 2007). The Net Worth Method does not tell investigators where
the unaccounted income comes from and cannot be used as direct proof of a crime, but the
method can lead investigators to dig further into the financial records of the suspected criminal
(Botha, 2009).
Percentage analysis. Forensic investigators can quickly spot red flags in financial data
by converting statement amounts into percentages of assets or revenue totals. Horizontal analysis
examines financial data from year-to-year, and unexpected changes in the percentages over time
can be examined further (Crumbley et al, 2007). For example, HealthSouth Corporation
underwent federal investigation for fraudulent misrepresentation of financial data and insider
trading in 2003 (Tie, 2010). The FBI suspected HealthSouth of inflating income and assets in its
financial statements; specifically, agents discovered the use of overvalued intangible assets to
reduce expenses over a period of several years as shown in Table 1 below.
CYE
CYE
1996CYE
19961996HealthSo
1996
1997
1996-1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
uth Corp.
(in
(in
$ Change
%
(in
$
%
$000)
$000)
Change
$000)
Change
Change
Intangibl
$1,094, $2,243, $1,148,95
$2,959, $1,865,4
105%
170%
e Assets
421
372
1
910
89
Table 1. Horizontal analysis can be used to spot fraud in financial statements. Source: Tie, R.
(2010).
The SEC reported that HealthSouth Corporations’ assets were overstated by $800 million by the
third quarter of 2002 (Litigation Release No. 18044, 2003).
Similarly, investigators can use vertical analysis to display data amounts as a percentage
of a total amount on a statement. For example, these percentages can be compared with other
accounts within the same company’s statement or with percentages from industry averages and
individual competitors. Forensic expert, Pam Mantone describes an example of the usefulness of
vertical analysis when examining accounts in a company’s statements:
“If sales are decreasing, accounts receivable is decreasing, and accounts payable is
increasing while expenses are decreasing, then it is reasonable for cash to be increasing.
If cash was decreasing in this scenario, a forensic examiner would spot the red flag by
conducting a simple vertical analysis” (2013, p.40).

In the same 2003 HealthSouth Corp. case discussed above, the FBI used vertical analysis to
compare HealthSouth to Tenet HealthCare Corp., a major competitor in the industry. Agents
discovered that HealthSouth’s intangible assets as a percentage of total assets were materially
greater than leading competition as shown in Table 2 below.

Intangible Assets

$2,243,372

Tenet HealthCare
Corp.
FYE 5/31/1998 (in
$000)
$3,417,000

Total Assets

$5,401,053

$12,833,000

Health South Corp.
CYE 1997 (in $000)

Intangible Assets as
42%
27%
% of Total Assets
Table 2. Vertical analysis can be used to spot fraud in financial statements. Taken from: Tie, R.
(2010).
In addition to percentage analysis, various ratio analyses can be performed to examine
relationships between accounts that can assist investigators in assessing a company’s liquidity,
solvency, asset management, profitability, market performance, and cash flow (Trussel, 2017).
Additionally, Edward Altman’s model7 (1983) and Messod Beneish’s model8 (1997) can assist
investigators in making judgements related to bankruptcy predictions and likelihood of earnings
manipulation respectively. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss all ratio analysis
functions available, but a more inclusive list can be found in the appendix of this paper. An
abnormality in a single ratio alone is not enough to suspect a company or individual of illegal
activity. Rather, forensic accountants can utilize qualitative review of financial statements with
quantitative percentage and ratio analysis to establish a better understanding of a company’s
financial environment and likelihood of fraud.
Other analytical measures. The overwhelming amount of data involved in a fraud or
money laundering case is a complicating factor for investigators. However, several additional
measures are at the disposal of forensic accountants including digital analysis and other data
filtering techniques. Physicist Frank Benford discovered in the 1920s that low digit numbers
occur more frequently in the world, a phenomenon that also applies to accounting records and
transactions (Nigrini, 1999). Benford found that data sets follow a “predictable pattern,” and
deviance from the expected pattern might suggest “artificial or contrived numbers” (Dorrell &
Gadawski, 2005, p. 3). Forensic accountants can apply Benford’s law to large data sets (e.g.
invoices or stock exchange data) to highlight irregularities. Dr. Mark J. Nigrini lists several other
practical applications of Benford’s law and digital analysis in examining financial data related to
accounts payable, multilocation inventory, processing inefficiencies, new selling price
7

8

More information on the Altman model can be found in Corporate financial distress: a complete guide to
predicting, avoiding, and dealing with bankruptcy. New York: Wiley.
More information on the Beneish Model can be found in “Detecting GAAP violation: Implications for assessing
earnings management among firms with extreme financial performance.” Journal of Accounting and Public
Policy, 16 (3), 271-309/ doi: 10.1016/S0278-4254(97)00023-9.

combinations, and customer refunds (1999, p. 81). Generally, daily accounting records by a
company are recorded to the cent and consist of a higher percentage of small transactions rather
than large transactions. Therefore, a high volume of large or rounded transactions should be
scrutinized. Additional digital analysis techniques search for excessive duplicated data and
transactions that fall between the $8,000-9,000 range to avoid mandatory reporting (Dorrell &
Gadawski, 2005). These digital techniques filter a huge population of transactions into a
manageable pool of transactions for the forensic accountants to examine manually for indications
of wrongdoing (Ibid).
The Net Worth Method, percentage analysis, Benford’s law, digital analysis, and other
technical measures are powerful tools used by analysts to investigate financial crimes. However,
the use of these techniques requires an understanding of mathematics, statistical modeling, and
numeric sequencing, but more importantly, the ability to interpret and further investigate the
results. With a background in public accounting, forensic accountants are typically comfortable
with large data sets and can apply these analytical techniques to filter data using Microsoft Excel
and other advanced software (Collins, 2017). Combined with industry experience and attention
to detail, forensic accountants are uniquely equipped with the technical skillset to help attorneys
and juries visualize and understand unusual or fraudulent accounting patterns in terrorist
investigations.
Civil Strategies Used by Forensic Accountants
Forensic accountants can be vital legal resources in civil and criminal investigation and
prosecution of suspected terrorists. However, prosecutions under criminal laws can be timeconsuming, labor intensive and require a higher burden of proof to convict (Smith & Cooper,
2009). Fortunately, there are a variety of civil statutes that are available to law enforcement and
investigators (Dorrell & Gadawski, 2005). Notably, Title 18 of the United States Code Section
2333(a) provides the legal basis to prosecute terrorists and terrorist sympathizers under civil
proceedings. Section 2333(a) was passed as a part of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992 as a
derivative of the criminal provisions provided in 18 U.S.C. §2339B9 and 18 U.S.C. §2339C10
(Smith & Cooper, 2009). Section 2333(a) states:
“Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may
sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s
fees.”
In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit affirmed a $156 million award to the
family of David Boim, a U.S. citizen who was murdered in Israel by members of Hamas. The
Washington Legal Foundation filed the suit under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992 against the
Holy Land Foundation and other defendants “for providing financial and other support to
18 U.S.C. §2339B prohibits knowingly providing (or conspiring to provide) support to a foreign terrorist
organization. To read the full statute, visit https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2339B.
10
18 U.S.C. §2339C prohibits providing or collecting funds intended to cause death or injury to a civilian. To
read the full statute, visit https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2339C.
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Hamas” (WLF, 2008). Boim v. Holy Land Foundation is a landmark case that “appears to have
cleared away the major obstacles complicating the use of section 2333(a)” and other civil
statutory measures in prosecuting terrorist financing (Smith & Cooper, 2009, p. 75).
In addition to U.S. Code Section 2333(a), courts have the ability to apply the doctrine of
alter ego; this allows courts to pierce the corporate veil and hold individuals responsible for the
wrongdoings of corporations that are otherwise treated as separate legal entities (Dorrell &
Gadawski, 2005). In Dietel v. Day (1972), the doctrine of alter ego is defined as follows:
“The corporate fiction will be disregarded when the corporation is the alter ego or
business conduit of a person…The alter-ego status is said to exist when there is such
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and
owners cease to exist” (16 Ariz. Ct. App., 492 P.2d 455).
The alter ego doctrine gives courts the power to prosecute individuals involved in organizations
that are directly linked to terrorists. Additionally, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 gives the U.S. Secretary of State the power to designate organizations and their
aliases as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). As described in National Council of
Resistance of Iran v. Department of State (2004), “Alias status is established… when one
organization so dominates and controls another that the latter can no longer be considered
meaningfully independent from the former.” The ramifications of this designation 1) makes it
illegal to knowingly support a designated FTO, 2) bars FTO representatives and members from
the U.S., and 3) allows banks to freeze the funds of a designated FTO (U.S. Department of
State). The alter ego doctrine and the FTO designation are powerful tools that are increasingly
utilized to pressure terrorists and affiliated organizations “to get out of the terrorism business”
(Ibid).
The statutory measures discussed above are only a few of the civil strategies used to
prosecute financial crimes. These cases generate demand for skilled forensic accountants to
collect evidence and perform data analysis functions to expedite the investigative process. Law
firms can hire forensic accountants as consultants or expert witnesses, and courts can appoint
forensic accountants as masters or special masters in specific financial cases (Crumbley et al.,
2007). Forensic accountants use their industry knowledge and skills to orally communicate
complex financial concepts and analyses to lawyers, judges, and juries (Curry, 2013; ACCA,
2015). As mentioned previously, if the intent to commit an act of terrorism can be proven, an
individual can be prosecuted under U.S. laws without funds ever moving locations (Dorrell &
Gadawski, 2005). Forensic accountants can provide expert testimony or interpretation of
financial analyses performed to help prove to the court that the defendant intended to commit a
crime. Extensive anti-terrorism statutes exist in U.S. civil and criminal law; combined with the
legal expertise of investigators and the financial expertise of forensic accountants, terrorists are
facing their hardest battle yet.
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Unfortunately, as counterterror task forces become more efficient and technology
advances, so do the terrorists. In his analysis, André Botha discusses the convoluted nature of

financial crimes and the inability of any classroom to adequately prepare investigators with all
necessary skills:
“The fight against financial crime is fraught with difficulties. It takes place in the global
sphere, in an extremely complex, sophisticated, and worldwide distribution, in a highly
technological environment… What the expectations of the community and authorities are
asking from investigators in the field of preventing and combating financial crime make
up a kind of knowledge which no existing discipline provides ready-made” (2009, p. 24).
The knowledge needed to combat financial crimes and terrorist financing cannot be learned in a
single setting, through a single academic discipline, or by a single individual. Rather, the
knowledge and skills are developed over individual careers and are best utilized when
individuals from various professions are brought together in counterterror teams. The
information gathered in this paper suggests that individuals who are trained in accounting and
pursued careers in banking, finance, or other financial sectors are advantageously prepared to
participate in forensic investigations due to the nature and expectations of their profession.
Forensic accountants in the FBI
Accounting has been an integral part of the FBI since its creation in 1908, but substantial
waves of accounting employees within the Bureau occurred 1) during the 1920s due to
Prohibition and mobsters like Al Capone,11 and 2) during the 1940s as a result of WWII
investigations involving the Surplus Property Act, Contract Settlement Act, and War Fraud
Claims (Bilbeisi & Brown, 2015; Crumbley et al., 2007). Demand for forensic accountants in the
FBI also increased in the early 2000s due to corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom
(Crumbley et al., 2007). Approximately 15 percent of FBI employees today are qualified special
agent accountants with a variety of certifications and specialties; these individuals must meet
high qualification standards and go through rigorous training (Curry, 2013, p. 200; Bilbeisi &
Brown, 2015). Forensic accountants are located in FBI offices across the nation and play an
important role in the Bureau and other governmental agencies as they investigate cases across a
wide criminal spectrum. Special agents often go into the field to collect evidence and conduct
surveillance and interviews. The agents then update the case files, and forensic accountants are
responsible for reviewing the evidence and identifying any red flags that may suggest a financial
crime is being committed (FBI Agent & Forensic Accountant, personal communication,
November 20, 2017).
After the September 11th attacks, the FBI created the Terrorist Financing Operating
Section (TFOS) to direct more attention to the financial aspect of counterterrorism (Terror
Financing, 2013). John Pistole, Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, stated:
“TFOS has developed tactical and strategic, time sensitive, financial investigative

The FBI pursued many mobsters during the 1920s, but the Bureau’s initial participation in the Al Capone case
was limited until he was suspected of a federal crime. Capone’s takedown is ultimately attributable to the forensic
accounting work of the U.S. Treasury Department. Capone was indicted and found guilty of tax evasion and
prohibition charges in October 1931 (Beebe, 2016; “Solving Scarface,” 2005).
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methodologies enabling the FBI to be recognized worldwide as the leader in this area.
TFOS has evolved into a broader strategy to identify, investigate, prosecute, disrupt and
dismantle incrementally all terrorist related financial and fundraising activities (2003).”
TFOS consists of special agents, analysts, forensic accountants, and other professionals that
jointly gather intelligence and follow money trails of suspected terrorists (Terror Financing,
2013). Additionally, white-collar crime divisions exist within many of the FBI’s 56 field offices
and typically investigate financial crimes such as insider trading, health care fraud, and bank
fraud. However, their accounting and finance expertise can be tapped into by the TFOS and other
joint task forces during times of crisis. For example, special agent accountants and forensic
accountants in white-collar divisions across the country were called upon to assist with the 9/11
terrorism investigation. Recently, the white-collar divisions in Tennessee were contacted to assist
with the investigation of the July 2015 terrorist attack on a Chattanooga military facility that
killed four U.S. Marines and one U.S. Navy officer (FBI Agent & Forensic Accountant, personal
communication, November 20, 2017; Rayman, 2015).
Outside of the FBI, other government organizations, notably the CIA and Department of
Homeland Security, employ accountants in various analyst positions in intelligence,
counterterrorism, and cyber threat divisions (CIA, 2017; DHS, 2017). These analysts participate
in high-profile investigations by gathering evidence, preparing support documents (e.g.
warrants), compiling findings in investigative reports, and meeting with prosecutors (Bilbeisi &
Brown, 2015). Identifying patterns and red flags in large sets of data takes a trained eye and
years of specialized experience. The FBI estimates that the Oklahoma City bombing cost
approximately $4,000 to execute, the attack on the USS Cole about $10,000, and the London
subway bombings around $14,000 (Terror financing, 2013). It is not uncommon that the dollar
amounts involved in executing terror attacks are very low, so the expertise that forensic
accountants and analysts possess is critical to national security. Organizations like the FBI and
DHS spend extensive advertising dollars on public campaigns such as “If You See Something,
Say Something12,” and strive to maintain open lines of communication with private institutions
who are often the true “first responders” of terrorist financing (Bures, 2013).
THE VALUE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
It is a common misconception that fighting terrorism is the sole responsibility of the
government. Parker and Taylor (2010) argue that we are experiencing “a new security paradigm
in which financial borders and parameters are best understood as a ‘complex assemblage’ in
which private financial institutions are in effect, authorized to make security decisions” (p. 459)
The National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. (2004) estimates that the private
sector controls approximately 85 percent of the country’s critical infrastructure, which in turn
makes many private U.S. companies a target for attack. Therefore, the private sector has the
opportunity, and arguably the responsibility, to contribute to counterterrorism efforts (Bures,
2013). The U.S. DHS describes critical infrastructure as “the essential services that underpin
American society and serve as the backbone of our nation's economy, security, and health. We
know it as the power we use in our homes, the water we drink, the transportation that moves us,
“If You see Something, Say Something” is the Department of Homeland Security’s campaign to encourage
citizens to report suspicious activity (e.g. signs of terrorist activity or human trafficking) to local law enforcement.
More information can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something.
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the stores we shop in, and the communication systems we rely on.” Homeland Security has
identified sixteen major infrastructure sectors13 that the department works closely with to share
information and monitor threats, but is this enough?
While a massive infrastructure breach has not yet occurred in the United States, other
countries around the world have experienced devastating attacks. Notably, three distribution
centers of a Ukrainian electricity company were remotely accessed by foreign hackers within
thirty minutes of each other leaving approximately 225,000 Ukrainians without power for several
hours on December 23, 2015. (ICS-CERT, 2016). The Electricity Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (2016) described this incident as the first cyber-attack of its kind that “targeted
solely civilian infrastructure,” through which the hackers demonstrated “an escalation from past
destructive attacks that impacted general-purpose computers and servers” (p. 20). This incident
should catch the attention of not only companies in charge of critical infrastructure, but
companies in all industries and should demonstrate how important public-partnerships are to
protecting company assets and civilian lives.
The Corporate Stake. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2017), the
global economic impact of terrorism was $84 billion in 2016. Terrorism has a direct impact on
businesses in all industries in the U.S. and abroad, and attacks have the potential to disrupt
supply chains, affect available employees, and dissuade investors (Rosand & Millar, 2017). For
example, Air France-KLM claimed the company lost $76 million in revenue as the result of the
November 2015 attacks in Paris (Landauro, 2016). Yet, many U.S. industries are still hesitant to
directly involve themselves in counterterrorism efforts. (Rosand & Millar, 2017). Bures (2013)
argues that while private institutions have the ability to play a large role in counterterrorism
efforts, the inherent emphasis that these institutions place on generating profits rivals public
interest and national security. For instance, a bank may place so much value on maintaining
customer relationships that employees are less likely to raise security concerns or question the
authenticity of documents (Mantone, 2017). Other companies distance themselves from the
politically charged environment surrounding terrorism to satisfy “sensitive” investors or are
overwhelmed by bureaucratic red tape and federal reporting mechanisms (Rosand & Millar,
2017). Despite the rationale for inaction, there is a need for transparent communication between
the private sector and government organizations if terrorist financing is to be combatted on all
fronts.
Potential Solutions. A strong counterterrorism task force and educational initiatives are
potential solutions to the lack of information flow between the private sector and U.S.
governmental agencies. Rosand and Millar (2017) suggest that President Trump utilize his vast
network of business connections to gather Fortune500 CEOs to discuss how the private sector
can be harnessed to combat terrorism. If companies were made aware of how terrorism has the
potential to negatively affect profits, they may be more inclined to protect themselves.
Additionally, the FBI should be encouraging key private-sector company members to join local
InfraGard chapters. The mission of the FBI’s InfraGard is to increase “public-private
collaboration with government that expedites the timely exchange of information and promotes
mutual learning opportunities relevant to the protection of critical infrastructure” (2018).
A full list of The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Sector Partners can be found
at https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships.
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InfraGard members have the benefits of chapter meetings to discuss best company practices,
online access to information about cyber threats, and an open line of communication with the
FBI.14
This collaboration between the public and private sector could create an incentive for
companies in key targeted industries (e.g. financial institutions, airlines, and cybersecurity) to
recruit and train forensic accountants and other analysts to closely monitor financial security
threats and communicate any concerns back to the organization. Within these critical
infrastructure sectors, forensic accountants could assist with the structure of internal controls that
prevent, detect, and correct threats to company assets. Within government agencies including the
FBI and Homeland Security, forensic accountants could track the dirty money coming into the
cities to thwart attacks. Because terrorism has the ability to disrupt almost all industries in the
U.S., security is a national concern that should be on the forefront of agendas in both government
and private sectors. Financial expertise, open lines of communication, and shared responsibility
are strong weapons in the United States’ War on Terror.
Terrorist Access to Information
With a quick internet search, anyone from anywhere in the world can access an
abundance of information from a computer or mobile device. Terrorists’ ease of access to legal
and procedural information in the United States poses a threat to law enforcement. Normal is the
new deviant, meaning terrorists can often complete their mission while blending in and following
U.S laws. Terrorists are becoming more aware of financial regulations and reporting
requirements, so they commit seemingly routine transactions that involve small sums of money
to avoid detection. These transactions are disguised as normal business operational activities,
which make fraud and laundering that much harder for officials to detect (FBI Forensic
Accountant, personal communication, February 8, 2017). As a result, forensic accountants will
continue to be needed in financial institutions to maintain a strong system of internal controls
and in government organizations such as the IRS and SEC to filter and investigate private-sector
reports.
The Rise of Virtual Currency
The rise of internet-based exchange is taking the global economy by storm, and financial
technology, or “fintech,” is changing the way business is conducted around the world (Ducas &
Wilner, 2017). Companies like PayPal and M-Pesa have already cashed in on facilitating online
purchases and transfers, but these internet-based markets have yielded the creation of a new and
uncertain phenomena: virtual currencies (He et al., 2016). The European Central Bank defines
virtual currency “as a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled
by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community”
(“Virtual Currency Schemes 2012, p. 5). Bitcoin, the most popular virtual currency, was created
in 2009 but only recently received international attention when the currency reached a peak price
equivalent to $19,783.21 in December 2017 (Higgins, 2017). Benefits of Bitcoin and others
include anonymity, timeliness, and lower transaction costs; however, the opportunity exists for
criminals to exploit the use of virtual currency in committing fraud, laundering money, and
financing terrorism (He et al., 2016).
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More information about InfraGard and membership opportunities can be found at https://www.infragard.org/.

Individuals can obtain Bitcoins by accepting them as payment for goods or services,
mining them through online networks, or purchasing them on an online exchange (Volastro,
2014). Virtual currencies are not regulated by any governing body, which opens the door for
terrorists and terrorist sympathizers to circumvent U.S. money laundering laws (Ward, 2018).
Both ISIS and the Mujahideen Shura Council announced the acceptance of Bitcoin donations in
2017 leading to an increase in virtual currency schemes globally (Ward, 2018). Additionally,
Zoobia Shahnaz, a 27-year-old U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was arrested in New York before
boarding a plane to Syria in July 2017. She was charged with bank fraud and money laundering
for allegedly using fraudulent credit cards to purchase Bitcoins to transfer to ISIS (Reuters Staff,
2017). If Shahnaz had obtained the virtual currency through legitimate means and then laundered
those funds to ISIS, the crime would have been exponentially difficult for law enforcement to
detect.
The United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union are investigating and
implementing policies to “crack down on… cryptocurrency” transactions (Ward, 2018). In May
2017, U.S. representatives Rice and Kilmer introduced HR2433, a bill that calls for a threat
assessment by the Department of Homeland Security on virtual currencies and associated risks
(Terletska, 2018). While the FBI recognizes the legality of Bitcoin transactions, agents have
made numerous arrests for fraudulent transfers and unregistered users (“Virtual Ticket,” 2017).
Still, the decentralized and anonymous nature of virtual currencies presents legal and
technological challenges for the FBI, IRS, and DHS moving forward (He et al., 2016).
The Dark Web
Virtual currency donations that terrorists receive through their fundraising campaigns can
be easily used to execute illegal transactions. In fact, Bitcoin and other virtual currencies have
become the preferred payment method used on the dark web to purchase items including
weapons, materials, and passports (Ward, 2018). For example, German authorities believe that
Ali David Sonboly, the man responsible for the July 2016 shooting in Munich that killed nine
civilians, obtained the firearm from Slovakia through the “dark net” (Bender & Alessi, 2016).
While authorities determined Sonboly was acting alone in his attack, the organized efforts of
groups like ISIS and Hamas could produce catastrophic destruction with resources obtained
through untraceable purchases made on the dark web. Terrorism has also infiltrated social media
and other legal websites leaving companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google in an
uncomfortable position between prioritizing the protection of users’ civil rights and national
security concerns.
The Impact on Forensic Accounting and Counterterrorism
A major challenge facing the counterterrorism environment is the inability of the FBI and
other government agencies to keep up with technological advancements like virtual currency
transactions. James Comey, former Director of the FBI, stated, “Unfortunately, there is a real and
growing gap between law enforcement’s legal authority to access digital information and its
technical ability to do so. The FBI refers to this growing challenge as “Going Dark,” and it
affects the spectrum of our work” (DOJ, 2017, p.2). Comey explains that criminals “who hide
their crimes and identities behind layers of anonymizing technologies… [and] use virtual
currencies to obscure their transactions” seriously limit the scope of FBI investigations (Ibid).
This information gap within the Bureau necessitates 1) recruiting and retaining top global talent

and 2) sharing information with other government agencies and private-sector businesses.
Further research may be necessary to examine the integration of government databases into a
single inter-agency data hub to exchange financial crime information.
With rapid technological innovation, the United States will need forensic accountants
more than ever. The automation of many accounting systems will increase demand for
individuals trained in both accounting and computer science. While numerous data processing
software exist to independently perform advanced financial analyses, forensic accountants will
be needed to monitor these systems and interpret the results. Accountants understand the
concepts and theories related to the underlying processes of accounting information systems and
are more familiar with the nuances of cash flows. With financial industry knowledge, in addition
to the soft and technical skills previously discussed, accountants can detect and correct errors in
the information systems more quickly than non-accounting personnel.
It is not feasible to examine every transaction, so forensic accountants will be needed to
perform analytical functions to identify patterns and red flags in data sets (FBI Forensic
Accountant, personal communication, February 8, 2017). It is often difficult to determine a
materiality threshold when investigating terrorist financing; investigators cannot label everything
as important, because then nothing is important (FBI Forensic Accountant, personal
communication, February 8, 2017). Materiality is a matter of professional judgment and requires
specific training and experience (Messier, Glover & Prawitt, 2016). While many processes like
manufacturing, dining, and even grocery shopping have the ability to be automated, professional
judgment driven by years of skill and experience cannot be programmed into an algorithm.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Terrorism is a global issue that affects all aspects of society. This paper contributes to
scholarly understanding of the environment in which terrorists operate and the unique
opportunity of forensic accounting to disrupt that environment. One limitation is that this study
was restricted to qualitative analysis only; quantitative analysis might provide more specific
feedback related to forensic accountant involvement in counterterrorism on a case-by-case basis.
This paper references two separate personal communications with a FBI forensic accountant and
a forensic accountant-special agent team. The connection between forensic accounting and
counterterrorism could be strengthened by conducting additional interviews with accountants in
other government bodies and within the private sector.
If we had the technology and laws in place in 2001 that we do today, could we have
prevented the September 11th attacks? With predictive analytics and innovative scientific
knowledge, can we determine when the next foreign terrorist attack on U.S. soil will occur?
These are important questions that government organizations and investigators should be asking
themselves. Michael Scheurer, one of the CIA intelligence analysts responsible for tracking
Osama bin Laden, stated, “One of the great intellectual failures of the American intelligence
community, and especially the counterterrorism community, is to assume if someone hasn't
attacked us, it's because he can't or because we've defeated him” (Leung, 2004). Terrorism is a
genuine threat that the United States must take a proactive, rather than reactive, stance in
combatting. Committing any act of terrorism involves some combination of planning and
allocating financial resources, and as long as terrorists need money, the United States needs

forensic accountants. Changes in political and technological climates across the globe present
many challenges to combatting terrorism, but the solution remains the same: Follow the money.
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Appendix
Table 1. Ratios assist forensic accountants in evaluating and identifying red flags in financial
statement data. A summary of significant ratio analysis functions can be found below. This is an
adapted list from J.M. Trussel’s ProFound: In-depth Financial Analysis ©2017.
Liquidity Ratios
Current Ratio

Current Assets ÷ Current Liabilities

Quick Ratio

(Cash + Cash Equivalents + Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable) ÷ Current Liabilities.

Cash Ratio

Cash and Cash Equivalents ÷ Current Liabilities

Average Collection Period

365 ÷ Accounts Receivable Turnover

Days' Inventory on Hand

365 ÷ Average Inventory

Operating Cycle

Average Collection Period + Days’ Inventory on Hand

Asset Management (Activity)
Accts. Receivables Turnover

Net Sales ÷ Average Accounts Receivable

Inventory Turnover

Cost of Goods Sold ÷ Average Inventory

Payables Turnover

Net Sales ÷ Average Accounts Payable

Working Capital Turnover

Net Sales ÷ Average Working Capital

Fixed Asset Turnover

Net Sales ÷ Average Fixed Assets

Total Asset Turnover

Net Sales ÷ Average Total Assets

Profitability Ratios
Gross Profit Margin

Gross Profit ÷ Net Sales

Return on Sales

Operating Profit ÷ Net Sales

Return on Assets

Net Income ÷ Average Total Assets

Pretax Return on Assets

Net Operating Income Before Income Taxes ÷ Average Total Assets

Return on Equity

Net Income ÷ Average Total Shareholder’s Equity

Dividend Payout

Dividends Paid ÷ Net Income

Leverage/Solvency Ratios
Debt to Equity

Total Liabilities ÷ Total Shareholder’s Equity

Debt to Assets

Total Liabilities ÷ Total Assets

Interest Coverage

Income Before Income Taxes and Interest Expense ÷ Interest Expense

LT Debt to Equity

Long-term Liabilities ÷ Total Shareholder’s Equity

Debt to Market Equity

Total Liabilities ÷ (Market Value per Share * Average Shares)

Market Ratios
Price-Earnings Ratio

Market Value per Share ÷ Diluted Earnings per Share

Book Value per Share

Total Shareholder’s Equity ÷ Average Shares

Market to Book Ratio

Market Value per Share ÷ Book Value Per Share

Dividend Yield

(Dividends Paid ÷ Average Shares) ÷ Market Value per Share

Sales to Market Value

Net Sales ÷ (Market Value per Share * Average Shares)

Cash Flow Ratios
CFO to Income

Net Cash from Operating Activities ÷ Net Income

CFO to Liabilities

Net Cash from Operating Activities ÷ Total Liabilities

CFO per Share

Net Cash from Operating Activities ÷ Average Shares

Cash Flow Adequacy

Net Cash from Operating Activities ÷ Net Cash Required for Investing Activities

